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NOTE AND COMMENT.
TnH -CHARACTER OF USER IN PaIscaipo.As the possession of the claim-
ant in a case of adverse possession must be shown to have been adverse in
order to ripen into title, so also must the user in prescription be shown to
have been adverse during -the endire prescriptive period. As to the burden
of proving the adverse character of the possession in the first case there
seems to be doubt whether there is a presumption of adverseness by showing
open possession and acts of ownership, or whether there is a burden upon the
claimant to go further. See 2 Am. & ENG. ENcY. L. & P. 392, and cases there
cited. The usual doctrine would seem to be that it is sufficient for the claimant
to prove the fact of -possession together with acts of ownership, as for
instance, the taking of the profits of the land. Of course in order to acquire
title he must show that ,his -possession had the further characteristics of
openness, continuity, exclusiveness, etc. But generally speaking, facts of
the nature above indicated are sufficient to show the 'hostile or adverse char-
acter of his possession. As to -the situation when the possession 'has been
due to a mistaken belief as to ownership see ii MICH. L. R1. 57.
The adverse character of the user in prescription causes more trouble.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
In prescription there is no taking possession of a parcel of land and xer-
cising of those unequivocal acts of ownership as in adverse possession. The
user, of course, must be proved, also that it 'was open, notorious, continuous,
etc. The difficulty arises in determining in a given case, such user being
shown, whether it was permissive or adverse. Ordinarily there is tno direct
evidence showing clearly which it was, and so the question must be deter-
mined from the circumstances of the particular case. In a large number of
cases it is said that open user for the statutory period is presumptively under
claim of right, and therefore is adverse. Carmody v. Mulroony, 87 Wls.
552; Smith v. Pennington, 122 Ky. 355, 91 S. W. 730, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)
149; Barnes v. Haynes, 13 Gray i88; Hanmnond v. Zelner, 23 Barb. 473;
Pavey v. Vance, 56 Oh. St. 162; Garrett v. Jackson, 2o Pa. St. 331; Fleming
v.,Howard, I5o Cal. 28, 87 Pac. go; Mitchell v. Bain, 142 Ind. 604; Cox v.
Forrest, 6o Md. 74; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N. J. L. 675; Nicholls v. Went-
worth, ioo N. Y. 455; Chalk v. McAlily, ii Rich. L. i53; Arbuckle v. Ward,
29 Ut. 43; Rogerson v Shepherd, 33 W. Va. 307. In Indiana there seems to
be a statute to that effect. On the other hand, in C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Ives,
202 Ili. 69, where it appeared that the user 'had been open and notorious for
the prescriptive period, the court said in substance that since -there was no
evidence to show that the user 'had been hostile the claimant 'had not made
out 'his case. Similar to the last cited case in the respect referred to are
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 2o5 Ill. 598;Stewart v. Andiews, 239 Ill. i86; Piano
Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471; Fish Co. v. Dudley, 37 Conn. 136. In the Ives
case the very circumstances of the case negatived the 'hostile character of
the user. 'In other words, the more reasonable explanation of the user was
that it iwas 'by permission. The statement sometimes made (see note in
8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 149) that open user for the prescriptive period is pre-
sumptively under a claim of right, and therefore adverse, is not'quite accu-
rate. Perhaps the following is more nearly accurate: open user for the
prcscriptive period is presumptively adverse unless under the circumstances
of the case the more reasonable explanation of the user is that it ,was by
permission. Or, putting it somewhat differently: open, continuous, and
notorious user is presumptively adverse, btt the presumption may 'be over-
come by the very circumstances of the case showing that the reasonable
explanation of the user is that it was throughout permissive. But then the
presumption does not help much,
In determining whether the user is explained more reasonably on the
ground of permission, or that it was because the claimant had a right, there
are involved a question of fact and the exercise of judgment. It would
seem to make a big difference over %vhat part of a man's land the right is
being exercised. For example, driving across waste land would, or could
very reasonably be explained on the basis of permission, 'while a way over
valuable, cultivated lands could be explained in reason, perhaps, only on the
basis that the claimant had such a right, for otherwise surely the servient
owner would not have sat by quietly. See Fish Co. v. Dudley, 37 'Conn. 136,
also Piano Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471. In, the very late case of Bruner
Granitoid Co. v. Lime & Cement Co. (Mo. App.) 152 S. W. 6oi, it Awas held
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that a long continued open user of a switch track by the defendant was
more reasonably explained on the ground, of permission because the plain-
tiff, across whose lands the switch track in part was located, -had during the
same time also been using the track. See also Barber v. Bailey, (Vt.) 84
Atl. 6o8. R. W. A.
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